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GAME THEORETIC MODELING OF AIMD NETWORK  
EQUILIBRIUM  
This paper deals with modeling of network’s dynamic using game theory approach. The process of interaction 
among players (network users), trying to maximize their payoffs (e.g. throughput) could be analyzed using game-
based concepts (Nash equilibrium, Pareto efficiency, evolution stability etc.). In this work we presented the model 
of TCP network’s dynamic and proved existence and uniqueness of solution, formulated payoff matrix for a net-
work game and found conditions of equilibrium existence depending of loss sensitivity parameter. We consider 
influence if denial of service attacks on the equilibrium characteristics and illustrate results by simulations.  
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Introduction 
It is almost impossible now to imagine 
our life without computer networks. Only for 
several decades, the Internet has rapidly 
transformed the ways in which individuals, 
societies and even governments communicate, 
exchange information and conduct their 
economic and social activities. And this 
process is far from the ending. As was 
envisioned recently by Google's executive 
chairman Eric Schmidt: “the internet will 
disappear as everything in our life gets 
connected. There will be so many devices, 
sensors, things that you are wearing, things 
that you are interacting with that you won't 
even sense it. It will be part of your presence 
all the time.”  
It seems that future Internet has to be 
self-organizing, self-protecting, and self-
optimizing.  
This next-generation communication 
environment will include interaction of 
intelligent devices that are capable of 
autonomously take decisions within highly 
dynamic and rapidly changing digital world. 
However, the continuous (and successful till 
now) development of networks, which is 
accompanied by exponential growing of their 
complexity, heterogeneity and distributive-
ness and which appears natural at the present 
time, creates new challenging problems. As 
mentioned in [1], to address these problems 
with appropriate approach we need to develop 
a new set of models based on control theory, 
game theory, and network optimization. 
First, let us introduce a problem on a 
high level. Consider a interaction between 
selfish users in a network (network here is 
some common pool with limited resources). 
Each user can adopt a method of action 
(strategy) which have influence on whole 
network and other users. The examples of 
actions are: choose protocol, change rate or 
route of data flows. For every possible 
combination of adopted strategies (outcome) 
there is a reward or utility for each user, 
which indicates his/her preferences over 
outcomes. Selfishness (or rationality in game 
theory terminology) means that a user wants 
to maximize utility. For instance, when user 
wants to download big file he prefers to 
receive as much network resources as 
possible. However, if user wants to read news 
then small but stable connection is sufficient. 
This situation leads to obvious conflict when 
summary users’ demand is bigger then 
network supply. If this happens network 
drops or delays users’ data, so generally it is 
not good for users. From the other side, 
network underloading (when demand is 
smaller then network capacity) is also 
undesirable because leads to inefficiency of 
resource using.  
Delivering information about network 
state to end user is a challenging problem and 
crucial part of any feedback based protocol. 
As a rule user has knowledge about successful 
delivery of his data (in other words he knows 
that network is probably underloaded) and 
about overload event (if he doesn’t receive 
successful ACK – acknowledgement packet) 
with some delay. This type of information is 
called binary feedback. The natural rate 
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control based on this information called 
AIMD (additive increase, multiplicative 
decrease) scheme. There are another 
possibilities, but it was proved that AIMD 
algorithm will oscillate near the point of 
effective (all bottle-necks will be loaded) and 
fair (in some sense) allocation of network 
resources. AIMD was the core of first version 
of first successful protocol – TCP, which still 
carries 70 percent of the Internet traffic. 
Nowadays, TCP isn’t one protocol but big 
family (number keeps increasing) of 
algorithms with different implementations of 
the origin idea. 
Protocol development went through 
the competitive evolution between different 
protocols, abandonment of some of them and 
appearance of new ones. The possibility to 
deploy new versions of protocols gives user 
control to improve performance of his 
connection by choosing suitable algorithm. 
When many users are trying to achieve better 
performance it is difficult to predict 
consequences of such a competition. There is 
a problem how to ensure stable, fair and 
effective network behavior in the situation of 
dynamic and antagonistic interaction of 
selfish users. First natural approach to address 
this problem with optimization framework 
was developed in work by Kelly et al. [2]. 
Later it was shown that congestion control, 
routing and scheduling in wired and wireless 
networks can be thought of as fair resource 
allocation. The protocols in this framework 
are nothing else as algorithms that allow a 
decentralized solution of the problem. This 
idea to consider network as an algorithm for 
solving maximization problem of total 
network utility (sum of users’ utilities) proved 
to be very fruitful [3]. The limitation in this 
approach is that protocol (in centralized or 
decentralized manner) dictates what strategy 
user should use.  
It is natural to assume that users try to 
improve performance of their connection by 
choosing suitable protocol. The problem here 
lies in interaction between different 
implementations of TCP which could be 
“unfriendly”. This means that one 
implementation is more “aggressive” and 
another is more “peaceful” in competition for 
resources. The question of protocols 
interaction is quite complex. Building analytic 
model for predicting network behavior for 
different protocols is a challenging problem. 
There are many approaches of investigation 
of complex networks from different directions 
(static, dynamic, deterministic etc). There is, 
however, novel systematic approach towards 
network modeling – the game theory. Game 
theory addresses problems in which multiple 
players with conflicting goals compete with 
each other. The evolutionary games concept is 
a part of game theory that focuses on studying 
interactions between populations rather than 
individual players. One of the earliest 
publications about the use of evolutionary 
games in networking is [4] that study through 
simulations some aspects of competition 
between TCP users. For this model it was 
shown that dynamic of this process described 
by difference equation has stable solution and 
users payoffs are forming a structure of 
evolutionary game known as Hawk-Dove 
game. Also there were identified conditions 
under which equilibrium is evolutionary 
stable. 
There is another possible reason of 
inefficient, unstable or unpredictable 
network behavior – security violation. 
Unfortunately, networks have many security 
issues: illegal data access, viruses, network 
attacks, etc. One of the most dangerous 
attacker’s activities are Denial of Service 
(DoS) attacks. DoS attack aims to stop the 
service provided by a target. When the traffic 
of a DoS attack comes from multiple 
sources, it called a Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) attack. By using multiple 
attack sources, the power of a DDoS attack is 
amplified and the problem of defense is 
made more complicated. Currently we have 
numerous DoS attack types. Each attack uses 
some special exploit of Internet protocols or 
software weaknesses. Recently novel type of 
attack was developed. This low-rate attacks, 
using carefully calculate timing, imply 
significant inefficiencies that tremendously 
reduce system capacity or service quality. In 
the literature, this kind of network intrusion 
is called shrew attack or Reduction of 
Quality (RoQ) attack. This constant 
development of new attacks demands new 
solutions especially in attack detection area.  
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Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) is 
a software which is used to monitor events 
occurring in a network. An IDS is also used to 
analyze these events in order to determine 
whether an attack has occurred. Once an 
attack is detected, a report is sent to the 
network administrator. Current IDSs are not 
very sophisticated and rely on ad hoc schemes 
and experimental algorithms. Due to these, 
IDSs need theoretical tools to handle 
sophisticated, organized attacks. Game 
theoretic approaches have been proposed by 
many researchers to improve network 
security, for example to analyze high level 
“security investment game”, but these models 
usually don’t include network dynamics.  
Game theory provides mathematical 
base for analyzing and modeling security 
problems with many agents which could 
interact in complex, dynamic environment. 
The advantage of game theory approach is s 
possibility of analyzing many different 
scenarios before adopting a certain strategy. 
Using mathematical modeling we can 
simulate network topology, controlling 
algorithms and users’ actions. This model 
could greatly improve network administration 
by predicting future security problems and 
likely behavior of users before we actually 
start to build our network.  
On the other hand network security 
measurements involve risk assessment. For 
example, one of the metrics is the probability 
of it being attacked. If we adopt game theory 
view on network dynamic then we can 
formulate conditions when interaction 
between rational users leads to an equilibrium 
state of the network. Network attack is a 
result of malicious actions of attacker. Attack 
changes equilibrium characteristics and could 
be therefore detected.  
In this work we describing integrated 
approach based on game theory models. First, 
we introduce formal model of TCP network 
dynamic. We mainly focus on AIMD 
behavior because it is the most important 
mechanism of TCP congestion control. Using 
dynamic systems theoretic results we show 
existence and stability of network resources 
allocation point. Then we consider game 
between users in the network and formulate 
conditions for Nash equilibrium existence and 
uniqueness. We introduce network attacker 
into system and estimate attack influence on 
equilibrium characteristics. Finally, we show 
simulation results and make conclusions of 
future trends. 
1. Game theory. Definitions 
We will limit our scope with non-
cooperative games in strategic or normal 
form. A non-cooperativeness here does not 
imply that the players do not cooperate, but it 
means that any cooperation must be self-
enforcing without any coordination among the 
players. Strict definition is as follows. 
A non-cooperative game in strategic 
(or normal) form is a triplet  
     iiii uSG ,, , 
where: 
   is a finite set of players, i. e., 
},...,1{ N ; 
 iS  is the set of admissible strategies 
for player i ; 
 RSui :  is the utility (payoff) 
function for player i, with NSSS  ...1  
(Cartesian product of the strategy sets). 
A game is said to be static if the 
players take their actions only once, 
independently of each other. In some sense, a 
static game is a game without any notion of 
time, where no player has any knowledge of 
the decisions taken by the other players. Even 
though, in practice, the players may have 
made their strategic choices at different points 
in time, a game would still be considered 
static if no player has any information on the 
decisions of others. In contrast, a dynamic 
game is one where the players have some 
information about each others’ choices and 
can act more than once, and where time has a 
central role in the decision-making. When 
dealing with dynamic games, the choices of 
each player are generally dependent on some 
available information. There is a difference 
between the notion of an action and a 
strategy. A strategy can be seen as a mapping 
from the information available to a player to 
the action set of this player.  
Based on the assumption that all 
players are rational, the players try to 
maximize their payoffs when responding to 
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other players’ strategies. Generally speaking, 
final result is determined by non-cooperative 
maximization of integrated utility. In this 
regard, the most accepted solution concept for 
a non-cooperative game is that of a Nash 
equilibrium, introduced by John F. Nash. 
Loosely speaking, a Nash equilibrium is a 
state of a non-cooperative game where no 
player can improve its utility by changing its 
strategy, if the other players maintain their 
current strategies. Formally, when dealing 
with pure strategies, i.e., deterministic choices 
by the players, the Nash equilibrium is 
defined as follows:  
A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium 
(NE) of a non-cooperative game  
     iiii uSG ,,  
is a strategy profile Ss *  such that for all 
i we have the following:  
),(),( *** iiiiii ssussu    for all ii Ss  . 
Here jijji ss   ,][  denotes the 
vector of strategies of all players except i . In 
other words, a strategy profile is a pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium if no player has an 
incentive to unilaterally deviate to another 
strategy, given that other players’ strategies 
remain fixed.  
Another important concept is Pareto-
dominance, which allow two strategies to be 
compared. The strategy profile Ss *  Pareto-
dominates  
Ss  if for all i  )()( * susu ii  . 
The strategy profile Ss *  is a Pareto-
optimal profile if it is dominated by no other 
profile. In Pareto-optimal profile no player 
could make his payoff better without worsen 
payoff of some other player. Now consider 
the notion of best response. The best response 
(BR) of player i to the strategy profile is  is a 
correspondence  
),(maxarg)( iii
Ss
ii ssusBR
ii


  .  
The BR  is a correspondence that is a set-
valued function. In practice this means that 
for some situations player has (possible) 
many strategies with the same payoff. Using 
best response notion we can characterize 
Nash equilibrium as follows. A pure-strategy 
Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game  
     iiii uSG ,,  
is a strategy profile  
Ss *  such that )( ** sBRs  . 
The strong side of Nash concept is that every 
game has at least one NE (under mild 
assumptions). From the other hand it is 
common situation to meet many NEs or to 
have Pareto-dominated NE.  
Let us define the last metric. From 
network performance point of view it is 
important to measure the aggregated payoff. 
The social optimum of a game is a maximum 
of the sum of the utilities of all players. Any 
social optimum is Pareto optimal.  
2. Game theory for security  
problems 
Let us fix following notations to 
explain attack-defense interaction in 
networks. Network is a collection of nodes 
and links. Node can be a server, user or 
router. Legitimate users are rational and 
interested in minimizing their own costs. Any 
user that launches an attack on a network is 
called attacker. IDS is a hardware or 
software system used to monitor the events 
occurring in a network or computer system. 
The main purpose of IDS is of course 
detection of attack. There are two possible 
issues: false alarms and missing detection.  
Several different approaches have 
been proposed for detecting intrusions. A 
currently widely used method is to check 
monitored events (packets in the network, log 
files, etc.) against a known list of security 
attack signatures. This approach has the 
advantage of enjoying a relatively small false 
alarm rate and ease of implementation. The 
disadvantages are the need to maintain and 
update the attack signature database, and the 
restriction to detection of only the known 
attacks documented in the database. These 
information structures are also useful in 
detecting more organized multistep attacks. 
An alternative approach is the anomaly 
detection, where changes in the patterns of 
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nominal usage or behavior of the system are 
detected. Although this approach increases 
the probability of detecting undocumented 
new attacks it is difficult to implement, and 
has often a higher false alarm rate. We 
introduce an idea to develop game theory 
based detection of anomalies. A significant 
shortcoming of the current IDSs is the lack of 
a unifying mathematical framework to put the 
pieces into a perspective. Game theory can 
provide a basis for development of formal 
decision and control mechanisms for intrusion 
detection. Specifically, game theoretic models 
can be used to address issues like the 
following: 
 Develop game model of network 
using huge amounts of data from detection 
mechanisms.  
 Finding weaknesses and possible 
targets of an attacker in a large complex 
system. 
 Reconfiguring the security system 
given the severity of attacks and making 
decisions on trade-offs like increasing 
security versus increasing system overhead or 
decreasing efficiency. 
 Deciding on where to allocate or 
reallocate limited resources in real time to 
detect significant threats to vital subsystems 
in a large networked system. 
 Analyzing of and modeling the 
interaction between different types of 
protocols, allocation algorithms and detection 
schemes. 
Game theory provides a framework to 
model interaction between selfish, compete-
tive users, malicious attackers and system 
administrator. Three key elements of such a 
system are: network dynamic model, game 
model and scenarios of malicious actions 
(attacks). Network dynamic modeling is a 
challenging problem, which was developed 
last decades. The work of F. Kelly et al. [2] 
was the first example of considering of 
Internet network resource allocation as an 
optimization problem. Later many authors 
[see for example 5–10] have developed 
generalizations of this framework. There are 
many approaches to investigation of complex 
networks from different angles (static, 
dynamic, deterministic etc.) using control 
theory, Petri nets, Markov chains etc. 
The evolutionary games concept is a 
part of game theory that focuses on studying 
interactions between populations rather than 
individual players. One of the earliest publica-
tions about the use of evolutionary games in 
networking is [11] that study through simu-
lations some aspects of competition between 
TCP users. The evolutionary games based on 
the concept of the ESS (Evolutionary Stable 
Strategy), defined in 1972 by the biologist 
Maynard Smith [12]. Fundamental survey of 
applications of game theory to networks is 
[9]. In this paper we develop the line of 
research presented in [13] by Altman et al. 
We consider a model of users which are using 
different TCP connections. For this model it 
was shown that dynamic of this process 
described by difference equation has a stable 
solution and users payoffs are forming a 
structure of evolutionary game known as 
Hawk-Dove game. Also there were identified 
conditions under which equilibrium is 
evolutionary stable. 
Considering distributed network of 
selfish players (e.g. the Internet) we meet 
problem of efficiency measuring. It is obvious 
that centralized planning could optimize 
overall performance of the system. 
Unfortunately, there are many reasons why it 
is not possible to construct centralized control 
over the Internet. However, game theory 
paradigm generated unexpected idea for 
dealing with such complex decentralized 
systems [15]. If game has unique NE and 
users are rational players then network will 
operate near this point even without 
coordination. Game structure, defined by 
utilities and strategies determine network 
evolution toward equilibrium point. So it is 
important to characterize the equilibrium 
efficiency and to find conditions of existence 
and uniqueness. A well-known way of 
characterizing the efficiency of the NE is to 
calculate whether or not it is Pareto-optimal. 
However, it is not uncommon for non-
cooperative game to have not Pareto-optimal 
NE. In the work [14] of Papadimitriou was 
introduced a concept of Price of Anarchy 
measure. Price of Anarchy (PoA) is equal to 
the ratio of the highest value of the social 
optimum to the lest optimal NE of the game. 
Another important metric is the Price of 
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Stability which is defined similarly by 
replacing the denominator of the PoA with the 
best NE of the game. 
We propose a concept for improving 
security through developing a game theoretic 
model for better understanding of processes in 
networks. On the first stage we build 
comprehensive network model with definite 
static game structure, which could be 
dependent on different parameters. Nash 
equilibriums determine possible dynamic of 
associated repeated game, so we could 
calculate metrics and characteristics. Based 
on this calculation IDS make decisions about 
anomalies and intrusions. 
3. Network dynamic model 
We start with notation of network 
modeling. All propositions in this and 
following chapters could be found in [16, 17] 
with detailed explanation.  
Consider a network with M nodes. 
Every node has at least one service link with 
limited overall capacity ip , Mi ,...,1  (e.g. 
processing rate, CPU time or network 
bandwidth). Let },...,1{ MI  , },...,1{ LK   
be sets of indexes of nodes and service links 
respectfully. There are N  users, connected to 
this network. Let )(tx j  be the transmission 
rate of j  user, where },...,1{ NJj  . There 
is natural assumption about vector of rates 
 Nxxx ,...,1 : 
NRx  . Users choose their 
rates )(tx j  at moment t . This means that 
packets streaming through link Kk  with 
summary rate 


)(
)(
ksj
jk txy , where )(ks  is 
a set of indexes of users, which use this link. 
In our simplified model there are no queues 
and information delays. If sum of transfer 
rates ky  less then node capacity kp , then all 
packets are served. If summary rate of flows 
using the node’s links is equal or bigger than 
the node capacity then overload event occurs 
(overload here is a synonym of packet loss). 
We will assume that routing is deterministic 
and uncontrolled and information about 
overload delivers to users momentarily. Let us 
fix the following notation throughout this 
paper. Denote )(tuk , Kk  as the service 
rate of k ’s link. The constituency matrix is 
the LM   matrix C whose ijc  element is 
equal to 1 if i ’s link belongs to j ’s node and 
otherwise is 0. Now we define a control set 
KRU  , which contains all possible service 
rates for the system. Let U  be a convex 
compact set from KR  and for any Uu  the 
inclusion  Uu  holds for any ]1,0[ .Let 
P  be },...,{ 1 Mppdiag  – diagonal matrix. 
The routing matrix R  is the MM   matrix 
defined for Pji , . Element ijr  is equal to 1 
if the output of i ’s link is the input of j ’s 
link and otherwise is 0. The input matrix A  is 
the NL  matrix defined for JjKi  , . 
Element ija  is equal to 1 if j ’s user uses i ’s 
link and otherwise is 0. 
Overload conditions. When the 
system produces overload and how one can 
analytically predict it? This is important 
problem of network modeling.  
Proposition 3.1. (Stability condition) 
If for )(tx , ],[ 10 ttt  there exist Uu , 
)1,0[ , such that  
  utxARP
M
k
kT 


 )(
1
0
1 , 
then the system doesn’t produce any overload 
events.  
If rates x  satisfy stability condition 
then network will be lossless. But from 
practical point of view, there are many 
problems with applicability of this condition. 
First, in real network each user doesn’t have 
information about system’s current state and 
about rates of other users so he cannot 
calculate proper rate. Second, user cannot 
choose any rate he wants (at least in TCP 
scheme). Instead he chooses protocol, 
controlling his rate.  
Geometric approach. Let 0x  be an 
initial vector of rates and  ,   vectors of 
parameters. According to original AIMD 
scheme user rates are increasing between 
overloads with rate  . When overload occurs 
rate drops to x . Now we will put into 
formal definitions.  
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Denote W  as a set  
 








 



 UwARPRw
M
k
kTN
1
0
1| . 
Let us define function 
}:0max{),( XxXx    and set 
 vvUvUvV  ),(: . Set V  is a subset 
of boundary of U , which belongs to 
NRint  
(V  is “active” in the sense that in these and 
only in these points overload are happened).  
Define it , 1i  as a first moment of 
time 1 ii tt , such that Vtx i )( . We will 
assume that the RTT (round trip times) are the 
same for all connections and losses are 
synchronized: when the combined rates attain 
capacity, all connections suffer from a loss. 
Consider following equation 



tN
i
ii tttxBItx
1
)()()()(  ,        (1) 
where   is delta-function, B  
},...,{ 1 Ndiag  , }:max{ ttnN nt  . 
Equation (1) is well-defined Caratheodory 
equation with discontinuous right-hand side, 
differential equations with impulses have 
been examined in many papers, which cannot 
all be referenced here. It is known that there is 
an almost continuous solution (continuous in 
all points except a set of measure zero) 



tN
i
ii tttxBIttx
1
)()()()(  ,      (2) 
where   is the Heaviside step function. 
Explicit formula (2) is not very practical but 
gives us important information about solution 
existence and its continuity in almost all 
points.  
Condition 3.1. For any Wx , such 
that VxARP
M
k
kT 



1
0
1 )(  it is true that 
WBx . 
Let us explain Condition 2.1 
informally. W  is the vector set of possible 
users rates. W  is convex compact set and 
Wtx )(  for 0tt  0tt  . As mentioned )(tx  
is an almost continuous function, and drops 
only happened when Vtx )( . After drop 
event users rates equal to )(tBx . The 
condition 2.1 means that after applying 
decreasing operator B  user rate still will be in 
the admissible set W .  
Main result. Now we can formulate 
the main result of this section – existence and 
uniqueness of the limit solution. 
Proposition 3.2. Let us consider 
admissible pair  ,  . If Condition 3.1 holds 
then for any Wx 0  solution of (1) exists and 
is converging to unique periodical solution 
)(ˆ tx . 
Using this property, we can calculate 
*x  directly  TTBIxc  1* )( . 
Now we consider a competition 
between users which use AIMD version of 
TCP with different parameters. Their 
connections are sharing a common network. 
We will assume that users send their packets 
exactly the same way, so we can reduce 
network topology to single link type with 
capacity c , calculated from the solution (2). 
4. NETWORK GAME MODEL 
In order to formulate game for our 
dynamic system in strategic form we must 
specify the players, their strategies, and their 
potential payoffs. We assume that there are 
N  AIMD strategies is  with control 
parameters ),( ii  , Ni ,...,1 . Denote S  as 
a set of all possible strategies. We consider 
payoff of the form  
)()()( sRsThpsJ ii  , 
where ),...,( 1 Nsss   – vector of strategies; 
iii xsThp )1(5.0)(   – average throughput 
of i ’s player; 0  – tradeoff parameter 
(sensitivity to losses); 
)(
1
)(
sT
sR   – loss 
rate.  
Example. Let us calculate payoffs for 
two strategies: 
,
2
4
)1(
),(),( 21
c
cssJssJ iiiiii






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),(
)(2
)1(
),( 21
21
11
211 







c
c
ssJ  
),(
)(2
)1(
),( 21
21
22
121 







c
c
ssJ  
),(),( 121212 ssJssJ  , ).,(),( 211122 ssJssJ   
Equilibrium in N protocols game. 
Consider game with N AIMD strategies. We 
assume that all is  are ordered lexicogra-
phically, Nsss  ...21 , where ji ss   
means that ji    and ji   . In other 
words protocols are sorted by aggressiveness 
ordering.  
Proposition 4.1. If   is sufficiently 
small than the most aggressive protocol is 
dominant strategy.  
Proof. Suppose i 1 , i 1  for 
all Ni ,...,2 . Consider payoffs for the first 
player ),( 111 ssJ  and ),( 11 ssJ j . Let us find 
period for both strategy profiles: 
,),(
1
11
A
c
ssT



 
where 
k
kA   is sum, defined by strategy 
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Calculate payoffs: 
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Condition of dominating of first 
strategy is  
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And since expression in right side is 
positive we obtain the result. 
For more subtle results about 
equilibrium’s characteristics see [16]. 
Nash Mixed and Pure in Two 
Protocols Game. Here we investigate the 
game for two protocols and find conditions 
for Nash equilibrium. From definition it is 
clear that ),(),( kkjkki ssJssJ   – we will 
write just  
),( kk ssJ , ),(),( kpjpki ssJssJ  , 
ij \}2,1{ . 
Using standard techniques for calculating 
Nash we obtain: 
),()1(),()( 211111 ssJpsspJsJ  ,  
),()1(),()( 221221 ssJpsspJsJ   
assuming the probability of player 2 using the 
first strategy is p . In Nash equilibrium the 
payoff can’t be further increased, so these two 
values should be indistinguishable, which 
leads to the following equation 
),()1(),( 2111 ssJpsspJ  = 
).,()1(),( 2212 ssJpsspJ   
Or, after solving it for p : 
p  
.
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Taking into account that p  is a probability, 
we impose a natural restrictions on it: 
10  p , where cases with 1p  or 0p  
result in game having a pure-strategy 
equilibrium (with dominant strategy 1s  and 
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2s , respectively), and 10  p  corresponds 
to the case of mixed-strategy Nash 
equilibrium. 
Should we investigate the conditions 
for the former, we get 
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Considering the case where game has pure-
strategy equilibrium, we get two possible 
conditions: 1p  or 0p . 
Solving the equations, we find the 
values of   that correspond to the case of 
dominant strategy: 
  
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Now, for the game to have mixed-strategy 
equilibrium the following system of 
inequalities must hold: 
1p  and 0p . 
After solving this system for   we get 
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Proposition 4.2. If   satisfies (4) 
then there is Nash equilibrium in mixed 
strategies. If   satisfies (3) then there is Nash 
equilibrium in pure strategies. 
Extension for Protocols Parameters. 
The game settings in previous sections were 
limited by aggressive ordering of protocols. In 
this section we weaken this condition to cover 
protocol parameters relation that falls beyond 
the “aggressive-peaceful” scheme, namely 
situation when 21    and 21   .  
Applying the same considerations as 
above, we get the same results for pure-
strategy Nash equilibria, but for mixed-
strategy equilibrium an additional constraint 
emerges. 
Since we’re looking for cases with 
10  p , we get the following conditions for 
0p : 
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Similarly, 1p  holds when  
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(It can be shown that other case with 
0),(),( 2221  ssJssJ  results 0 , which 
has no physical sense, recalling that   is an 
error weight). 
So, in the end we have the following 
system of inequalities: 
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Or, after replacement of J  and 
transformations 
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We get two possible solutions to the system 
above: 





,
,0)1()1(
12
2112


 
or  





.
,0)1()1(
21
2112


 
Since 21    and 21    then 12   , the 
actual solution is  
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Proposition 4.3. If 21    and 
21    and  
1
21
21
1
)1(





 , 21   , 
then there is evolutionary stable equilibrium 
in mixed strategies. 
Formulated conditions are consistent 
with the previous result with regards to 
protocol parameters specifics. 
5. NETWORK ATTACKS 
SIMULATIONS 
We study in this section numerically 
dynamic system (1) and equilibriums of 
defined game with replicator dynamics. The 
practical value of these results could be 
divided on two parts. Firstly, this is analytical 
tool for predicting shares of network 
resources for given set of AIMD protocols. 
Secondly, we can model users’ behavior 
(taking into account usual game theory 
assumptions about rationality, common 
knowledge etc.) using replicator dynamic 
equation. This equation is rather quality 
solution tool that show a dynamic and shares 
of network resources for each users group. 
Solution for dynamic system. Nume-
rical simulations were made using Wolfram 
Mathematica environment. On the picture 
below we show convergence of AIMD 
scheme for 2 and 3 dimensions. 
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Fig. 1. Simulations results for 2-d 
and 3-d systems 
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Attack modeling. To test theoretic 
model described above, a simulation model 
was developed under NS-3 Network 
Simulator package. The specifics of the 
model, as well as simulation results, are 
described below. 
For the purposes of testing, a simple 
topology consisting of four nodes was built 
(fig. 2) – the nodes represent sender, router, 
receiver and attacker. 
Node A
10.1.2.2
Node E
10.1.3.2
Node B
10.1.1.0
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
Node C
10 Mbps
 
Fig. 2. Testbed topology 
The basic workflow is as follows: the 
sender (Node A) uploads a large file to some 
storage, controlled by file server (Node B), 
that resides in a different subnet. Thus, a large 
volume of traffic is generated and routed 
between the adjacent subnets by router (Node 
C). Then an attacker from the sender’s subnet 
steps in (Node E). His goal is to disrupt a 
client-server operations by performing a 
denial-of-service attack, but, as router comes 
equipped with basic flood-detection 
capabilities, attacker won’t be able to perform 
a full-scale UDP or ICMP DoS attack, and 
has to resort to different means. 
He chooses a particularly stealthy 
approach known as low-rate TCP denial-of-
service attack, which exploits the weakness of 
TCP retransmission mechanism to cause a 
significant service degradation or even a full 
outage. The idea is the following: as TCP 
employs an exponential backoff technique for 
retransmission of packets presumed to be lost, 
it is enough for an attacker to cause a short-
term service outage with traffic spike and then 
maintain this state by sending the same spikes 
on the exact moments the client attempts to 
retransmit a packet. In more detail, if the 
client detects a packet loss at time t, it is 
enough for an attacker to perform short-term 
DoS in moments t+RTO, (t+RTO)+2*RTO, 
((t+RTO)+2*RTO )+4*RTO and so on, where 
RTO is a value of TCP retransmission 
timeout. Moreover, lots of TCP 
implementations have the default RTO value 
of 1 second, which makes the described attack 
feasible even for networks with large amount 
of clients, as they are likely to have close 
RTO values. 
The setup of NS-3 model is as 
follows: at time 0 the client at Node A 
establishes the connection with the server at 
Node B and starts sending data using TCP. 
Then, at 20 seconds from the beginning of a 
simulation, an attacker at Node E kicks in, 
periodically sending 30 traffic spikes of 
predefined length, separated by periods of 
silence. We denote the period between traffic 
spikes as T, and the length of the spike itself as 
τ. Obviously, different values and ratio 
between T and τ would yield different results 
in terms of attack success, with most 
prominent being achieved as T nears RTO. 
Depicted on fig. 3 are sample graphs of client 
congestion windows dynamics under different 
values of T with τ being the same value of 0.1.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Congestion window 
dynamics at T = 0.9 and T = 1 
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As shown on graphs, the least goodput 
(and the most successful denial-of-service) is 
achieved with T being equal to default RTO 
value, which is consistent with theoretically 
predicted results. 
Further, we investigate a client 
throughput change during attacks with 
different T values. The resulting graph, 
presented at fig. 4, shows the performance 
degradation of client on 10 Mbps link under 
different attacks with the same total amount 
of traffic sent. 
 
Fig. 4. Client throughput 
depending on attack parameters 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have presented an 
overview of approaches to deal with security 
problems using a game-theoretic framework. 
The general objective was to identify and 
address the security and efficiency problems, 
where game theory can be applied to model 
and evaluate security problems and 
consequently used to design efficient network 
control solution. The application of game 
theory is an emerging field in network 
security, with only a few papers published so 
far.  
Game theory provides a (parametric) 
model, which is refined and calculated using 
statistical data from real network. This model 
is actually a set of three layers of models, 
discovering system’s dynamic and users’ 
behavior from different angles. The first layer 
is a game between user and network. Solution 
is the protocol – strategy of user data flow. 
The second later is a game among users. Each 
user tries to receive maximal resource. This is 
non-cooperative game. Rational behavior 
leads to the Nash equilibrium (through its 
computing can be very complex). Network 
tries to balance users and achieve effective 
NE. System allocation algorithms efficiency 
is measured by PoA or PoS metrics. The last 
layer is a game with attacker. Attacker wants 
to disrupt network and prevent users from 
receiving any resources. This is game with 
pure conflict (zero-sum game). Analysis of 
resulting NE gives us metric to measure 
strength of attack and detect weaknesses of 
system.  
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